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The present research investigates the moderating role of goal interdependence and
dissent on individual preference confirmation in hidden-profile tasks. We propose
that preference confirmation can be used strategically to deal with competition
and dissent likely to arise in group decision making. In two studies, participants
first received incomplete information about a car accident investigation, and then
read a fictitious discussion with two other participants containing full information.
The interaction with the fictitious participants was presented either as cooperative
or competitive. We predicted and found preference confirmation to be higher in
competition than cooperation, when initial preferences were dissenting (Studies 1 & 2),
but to be higher in cooperation than in competition, when initial preferences were
consensual (Study 2). Also, the increased versus decreased preference confirmation in
competition with, respectively, dissent and no dissent were found to be predicted by self-
enhancement strategies (Study 2). These findings contribute to a better understanding
of the boundary conditions of preference confirmation in hidden profiles and shed a
new light on the role of motivated information processing in these tasks.
Many organizations rely on groups to make decisions, because they expect the con-
frontation of different viewpoints to increase the quality of decisions (Sessa, Jackson,
& Rapini, 1995). However, a great deal of research has shown that people are often
reluctant to accept others’ perspectives and prefer information consistent with their
favoured or chosen alternative (e.g., Frey & Schultz-Hardt, 2001; Schulz Hardt, Frey,
Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002). Imagine a young
doctormaking a diagnosis in a complex, risky case. Her superior requires her tomeetwith
two fellowmembers of the medical team in order to discuss the case. They have different
backgrounds, and they each possess unique additional information that leads them to
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support different diagnoses. Although this confrontation is in the best interest of the
patient and the team as a whole, competitive pressure, related to promotion or prestige,
for instance, may exist within the team. Under these conditions, being open to others’
divergent positions and information is neither easy nor constructive (e.g., Darnon, Butera,
& Harackiewicz, 2007; Darnon, Harackiewicz, Butera, Mugny, & Quiamzade, 2007).
Rather, people tend to process information in a way that is consistent with their initial
preferences. This article aims to test the general hypothesis that confirmation of one’s
own preferences is motivated by competition and dissent in group decision making.
Preference confirmation in hidden profiles
In group decision-making research, hidden profiles portray tasks in which group
members initially support suboptimal preferences, based on their information. They
could detect a better solution by taking into account others’ unshared information, but
a number of studies have shown that most groups fail to solve hidden profiles (see for a
review, Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996), either because group members do not discuss the
unshared information (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987) or because they use the discussion to
exchange their preferences and, based on them, to negotiate the final decision (Gigone
& Hastie, 1993, 1997).
Studies have generally focused on group-level processes to account for group
members’ inability to discover hidden profiles (Winquist & Larson, 1998). However,
Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) have shown that, in the absence of any dysfunc-
tional group-level process, individual group members still have difficulties in detecting
the best solution because they exhibit an individual preference confirmation. These
authors argue that members’ initial preferences, derived from their own unshared
information, lead them to evaluate subsequent information consistent with their initial
preference more favourably than inconsistent information. In addition, Greitemeyer
and Schulz-Hardt (2003) have shown that the preference for consistent information
is the mediating mechanism of preference-consistent decisions. This work provides
supplementary insights into hidden profiles by identifying an important individual-
level process that impedes group decision quality. However, individual- and group-level
processes are often interrelated in hidden profiles and therefore the strength of individual
preference confirmation could be moderated by group-level processes. In the present
research, we propose that individual-level preference confirmation may serve group-
level motives, such as dealing with dissenting partners in competitive decision-making
situations.
Cooperation and competition in hidden profiles
Our first argument is that individual preference confirmation might be influenced
by group members’ goals. In Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt’s research, participants
were not instructed to pursue any specific social goal when confronted to others’
information. However, most of hidden-profile studies implicitly assumed participants
have cooperative goals when processing information, and thus underestimated the
impact of competitive goals in this task (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004).
Various competitive goals (desire to attain a high status, proving competence) are present
in group decisionmaking and they do affect processing activities and strategic behaviours
(De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). Indeed, previous studies have
shown that people may react defensively when their own preferences are questioned,
especially if they are motivated by competition (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005).
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Competition is associated with self-enhancement goals that individuals might strive to
satisfy by using confirmatory strategies. Because competition diminishes the need to
belong to the group, it reinforces concerns for superiority and differentiation (Hornsey
& Jetten, 2004). The confirmation of one’s own initial preferences might be used as
a strategy to attain this relational goal. Some studies suggested that under competition
individuals confirm their own initial position (Butera & Mugny, 1995, 2001), as this
is helpful in preventing losing the competitive advantage (Leyens, Dardenne, Yzerbyt,
Scaillet, & Snyder, 1999). The self-enhancement motive activated by competition (Ross
& Wilson, 2003) may lead people to wrongly believe that they are right while the
other is wrong, and therefore they may avoid disconfirming their initial preferences in
competition. In line with this idea, Toma and Butera (2009) have recently shown that
in hidden profiles, competition, compared to cooperation, increases the strategic use of
confirmation at the group level.
Cooperation and competition effects as a function of dissent
Our second argument is that the above dynamics interact with the fact that individual
preference confirmation is influenced by the diversity of individual members’ pref-
erences. A great deal of research suggests that dissent can have both reducing and
enhancing effects on confirmation use.
On the one hand, research on group decision making show that dissent counteracts
or eliminates the use of confirmation (e.g., Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000, 2002) and improves
decision quality (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2002; Lam
& Schaubroeck, 2000; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).
Moreover, research onminority influence reveals that dissent proceeding from consistent
minorities stimulates divergent thinking and creativity (Legrenzi, Butera, Mugny, &
Pe´rez, 1991; Nemeth, 1986), leading to open-minded information processing (Tjosvold,
Johnson, & Lerner, 1981). On the other hand, research on social influence and hypothesis
testing has shown that dissent can also enhance confirmation when coming from
a majority (Butera, Mugny, Legrenzi & Pe´rez, 1996; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996) or a
competent, high-status source (Butera, Caverni, & Rossi, 2005).
By taking into account members’ cooperative and competitive goals, it appears that
both reducing and enhancing effects of dissent on preference confirmation should be
predicted. According to the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949,
1973; see also Johnson & Johnson, 1989, 2005), competition should increase preference
confirmation, while cooperation should decrease this bias. In competition, individuals
attempt to defend their own position by excluding the positions of others (Butera &
Mugny, 2001). Thus, dissent within competition induces defensive reactions and denial
of alternative positions; recent research has shown that dissent (termed conflict in these
articles) associated with competitive motives produces attempts to resist the other’s
position by maintaining one’s own (Buchs, Pulfrey, Gabarrot, & Butera, 2010; Darnon,
Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, & Butera, 2006). As suggested by Leyens et al., (1999),
competition comes with a great deal of negative effects, and confirmation may be helpful
in preventing losing the competitive advantage.
In cooperation, on the contrary, individuals trust each other and are encouraged
to investigate alternative solutions and to assimilate divergent perspectives (Johnson
& Johnson, 2005). For instance, Buchs, Butera and Mugny (2004) showed that a truly
cooperative interaction, as compared to a potentially competitive one, elicits more
constructive effects such as better relationships, integration of the partner’s perspective,
and increased learning. Cooperation has also been shown to facilitate the processing of
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information in groups characterized by diversity (Homan et al., 2008). Thus, dissent
within cooperation can help group members to overcome differences and to reduce
the use of confirmation. In fact, the sense of complementarity it involves may even
decrease individuals’ tendencies to rely on preference confirmation. In sum, we expect
that preference confirmation should appear most when disagreeing with competitors
and least when disagreeing with cooperators.
Overview and hypotheses
We investigated individual preference confirmation in two studies by setting up a
fictitious group discussion about a hidden-profile task, as in Greitmeyer and Schulz-
Hardt (2003). Participants were first oriented towards a suboptimal initial preference.
Then they received consistent and inconsistent information about their preference
and were asked to evaluate this information and reach a final decision. Thus, in the
present work, preference confirmation refers to two separate measures – preference for
consistent information (higher ratings for consistent than for inconsistent information)
and confirmatory decision (the final decision reproduces the initial preference). A pilot
study was designed to assess whether the basic materials for the main experiment –
without manipulation of dissent and goal interdependence (cooperation, competition) –
replicated the preference confirmation effect observed by Greitmeyer and Schulz-Hardt
(2003). The main studies directly manipulated cooperation and competition, as well as
dissent.
In Studies 1 and 2, we expect that the preference for consistent information will
occur to a greater extent in competition than in cooperation, when the dissent with
others’ preferences is present, but not when this dissent is absent (Hypothesis 1).
We also expect that, when asked to select the final decision, more participants in
competition than in cooperation will adopt the confirmatory decision, when the dissent
with others’ preferences is present, but not when this dissent is absent (Hypothesis 2).
We have argued that preference confirmation can be used as a strategic tool to deal with
dissenting competitors; this implies that the two measures of preference confirmation,
namely preference for consistent information and confirmatory decision, should be
linked in a coherent behaviour. Therefore, on the basis of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we
expect that the preference for consistent information should mediate the joint effect of
goal interdependence and dissent on the confirmatory decision (Hypothesis 3, mediated
moderation hypothesis). Finally, Study 2 directly tested the hypothesis that preference
confirmation reflects strategic behaviour in competition.We therefore expect preference
confirmation in competition to be related to self-enhancement strategies as a function
of dissent (Hypothesis 4).
STUDY 1
Method
Participants and design
Eighty undergraduate students from a large French university volunteered for this study.
The sample included 41 women and 39 men (M = 25.67 years, SD = 5.73). A 2 (goal
interdependence: cooperation, competition) × 2 (dissent: present, absent) between-
participants factorial design was used. Five participants were excluded because they
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did not choose the intended initial preference. Twenty participants were randomly
assigned to each experimental condition. Preliminary analyses revealed that gender did
not influence main effects or interactions on our dependent variables; therefore, this
variable was not included in the final analyses.
Procedure and materials
Participants had to find the guilty person in a car accident investigation. They worked
individually, and then they were led to imagine that they would work in a team. The
role-play story had participants pretend they worked as police inspectors with two other
people in order to identify the party responsible for the car accident. Four people were
potential suspects, but three of them could be exonerated (Mr. X, Mrs. Y, Mr. Z) and
the fourth (Mr. X’s son) incriminated based on a critical set of nine clues. The entire
set of information contained 28 clues: 19 clues were shared, and the 9 critical clues
were unshared. A hidden profile was created by distributing three different critical clues
to the participant and the two other fictitious group members in a way that created
an initial dissent: The naive participant was oriented toward Mr. X, while the fictitious
participants were attributed Mrs. Y and Mr. Z as initial preferences. All participants were
asked to express their initial preference (Mr. X), and then they were informed that they
did not possess the entire set of information, and that for this reason, they would be
provided with supplementary information given by the two other participants. Goal
interdependence and dissent manipulations were introduced at this point. Participants
were led to imagine that both their goal and that of the fictitious members was either to
grant the group success (positive goal interdependence, i.e., cooperation) or to ensure
the individual success (negative goal interdependence, i.e., competition) in the car
accident investigation. It was also explained that a successful end of the investigation
would provide them all (cooperation) or only one of them (competition) with a very
promising promotion. With regard to dissent, participants were either told that others’
initial preferenceswere, respectively, Mrs. Y andMr. Z (dissent, participants are oriented
towards an initial preference for Mr. X), or no information was provided (no dissent).
Subsequently, participants received six items of information, three consistent and three
inconsistent with their initial preference (Mr. X), supposedly coming from the two
other people. An example of consistent information was that the person responsible
for the accident is a man. An example of inconsistent information was that the person
responsible for the accident is less than 30 years old (participants knew Mr. X is
53 years old). The consistent and inconsistent information was presented in random
order for each participant. Participants were asked to evaluate the items of information
with regard to their importance in making an optimal decision. Finally, participants were
asked to make a final decision based on all the information. All participants were asked
to come up with the best decision. The participants were free to take as much time
as they needed for each phase, but they were not allowed to go back to the previous
phases. At the end of the session, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Dependent measures
Preference for consistent information
Participants evaluated to what extent the six received items of information were
important in reaching the optimal decision, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all
important) to 9 (very important). As this information included three items consistent
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( = .71) and three items inconsistent with participant initial preference ( = .79), a
mean score for each type of information was computed. The preference for consistent
information was computed by subtracting the ratings of the inconsistent information
from the ratings of the consistent information, and refers to the extent to which
participants evaluated information in a way that confirmed their initial preference. A
positive score indicates that consistent information was considered more valuable than
inconsistent information, and a negative score indicates that inconsistent information
was considered more valuable than consistent information.
Confirmatory decision. We derived a dichotomous measure from the final decision
reported by participants, namely the confirmatory decision, expressing whether
participants maintained (coded 1) or not (coded 0) their initial preference (Mr. X).
Pilot study
A pilot study with 20 participants using the same material and the same procedure, but
without the goal interdependence and dissent manipulations, was run independently,
to assess whether the basic materials of the present experiment yielded similar results
as compared with previous research. The results of this study show that participants
evaluated consistent information (M = 5.85, SD = 1.88) more favourably than inconsis-
tent information (M = 4.90, SD = 1.18), t(19) = 2.18, p < .05, which corresponds to
a preference for consistent information. Moreover, most of these participants (15; 75%)
chose the confirmatory decision,  2(1, N = 20) = 5.00, p < .05, thus replicating the
preference confirmation effects found by Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003).
Results
Preference for consistent information
To examine the preference for consistent information, we used a 2 (goal interdepen-
dence: cooperation, competition) × 2 (dissent: present, absent) analysis of variance
(ANOVA). This analysis revealed a main effect of goal interdependence, F(1, 76) = 4.13,
p < .05, 2 = .05. More preference for consistent information occurred in competition
(M = 0.37, SD = 2.19) than in cooperation (M = −0.50, SD = 1.81). No main effect
of dissent was found, F(1, 76) = 1.39, p = .24, 2 = .02. More importantly, the pre-
dicted two-way interaction between goal interdependence and dissent was significant,
F(1, 76) = 7.87, p < .01, 2 = .09. Follow-up analyses showed that in the dissent
condition, more preference for consistent information occurred in competition (M =
1.23, SD = 2.56), than in cooperation, (M = −0.85, SD = 2.06), F(1, 76) = 8.01, p< .01,
2 = .10. When dissent was absent, no difference between competition (M = −0.48,
SD = 1.33) and cooperation (M = −0.15, SD = 1.49) was found, F < 1. These results,1
which support hypothesis 1, are illustrated in Figure 1.
Confirmatory decision
Overall, 31 of 80 participants (38.75%) chose this decision. Logistic regression analyses
revealed amain effect of goal interdependence,B= −.61, SE = .25,Wald  2(1,N = 80)=
1In Study 1 preference for consistent information was significantly different from 0, only in competition with dissent, t = 2.15,
p .05, all other ps .10. In Study 2 preference for consistent information was marginally different from 0 in competition with
dissent and in cooperation with no dissent, t = 1.93, p = .06, while preference for inconsistent information was significantly
different from 0 in cooperation with dissent, t = -3.77, p  .001, all other ps  .10.
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Figure 1. Preference for consistent information as a function of goal interdependence and dissent
(Study 1).
6.48, p < .05: More participants chose the confirmatory decision in competition (21;
52.5%) than in cooperation (10; 25%). No main effect of dissent was found, B = −.27,
SE = .23, Wald  2(1, N = 80) = 1.30, p = .26. Furthermore, the predicted interaction
between goal interdependence and dissent was significant, B = .50, SE = .25, Wald
 2(1, N = 80) = 4.12, p < .05: In the dissent condition, significantly more participants
chose the confirmatory decision in competition (14) than in cooperation (4), B = .50,
SE = .13, Wald  2(1, N = 80) = 4.91, p < .05, while when dissent was absent the
effect of goal interdependence was not significant, B = .05, SE = .16, Wald  2 < 1
(six participants in cooperation compared to seven participants in competition). These
results2 support hypothesis 2. The proportions of confirmatory decisions corresponding
to each condition are presented in Table 1.
Mediated moderation analysis
We tested whether the goal interdependence by dissent interaction effect on the
confirmatory decision was due to a preference for consistent information, which
corresponds to hypothesis 3. The tested model is depicted in Figure 2. We followed
the procedure set forth by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005). Goal interdependence
and dissent were contrast coded (cooperation −1, competition + 1; no dissent −1,
2We also analyzed the proportion of correct decisions expressing whether participants identified (coded 1) or not (coded
0) the best decision corresponding to the discovery of the hidden profile (Mr. X’s son). In Study 1, these analyses
revealed a main effect of goal interdependence,  2(1, N = 80) = 5.11, p  .05. In cooperation more participants
chose the correct solution (24; 60%) than in competition (13; 32.5%). A main effect of dissent was also found,  2
(1, N = 80) = 5.11, p  .05: In the dissent condition fewer participants chose the correct solution (13; 32.5%) than in the
no dissent condition (24; 60%). In Study 2 analyses on the proportion of correct decisions revealed an interaction between
goal interdependence and dissent  2(1, N = 120) = 9.01, p  .01. In the dissent condition, more participants chose the
correct solution in cooperation (9; 45%) than in competition (2; 10%) or in control condition (3; 15%),  2(1, N = 120) =
8.01, p  .01. In the no dissent condition, more participants chose the correct solution in competition (10; 50%) than in
cooperation (4; 20%) or in control condition (6; 30%), but this effect was not significant  2(1, N = 120) = 4.20, p = .12.
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Table 1. Proportions of confirmatory decisions in Studies 1 and 2
Dissent No dissent
Cooperation Control Competition Cooperation Control Competition
Study 1 0.20 0.70 0.30 0.35
Study 2 0.30 0.50 0.75 0.60 0.55 0.35
Confirmatory 
Decision Cooperation 
Competition 
Preference for 
Consistent 
Information 
Dissent with 
Others’ 
Preferences 
Figure 2. The moderated mediation model used to predict the confirmatory decision.
dissent + 1), and preference for consistent information was centred at its mean.
An overall moderation of goal interdependence and dissent was first tested on the
dependent variable (confirmatory decision) and on the mediating variable (preference
for consistent information). Then, we tested whether controlling for preference for
consistent information reduced the overall moderation. Twomultiple logistic regressions
and one linearmultiple regressionwere used for the three equations. In the first equation,
the overall moderation was found on the confirmatory decision, B = 2.00, SE = 1.00,
Wald  2(1, N = 80) = 3.98, p < .05. In the second equation, the overall moderation
was found on the preference for consistent information, B = −3.01, SE = .92, t(79) =
−3.29, p < .001. In the third equation, when controlling for preference for consistent
information, the overall moderation was no longer reliable, B = 1.10, SE = 1.17, Wald
 2(1, N = 80) = 0.89, p = .35, while the preference for consistent information still
predicted the confirmatory decision, B = −.53, SE = .17, Wald  2(1, N = 80) = 9.73,
p < .01. Moreover, the residual of the moderation of goal interdependence by dissent
was reduced from B = 2.00 to B = 1.10, one-tailed ZSobel = −1.68, p < .05. Table 2
presents the regression models that estimate equations 1 through 3 with these variables.
Discussion
The pilot study, where neither goals nor dissent were manipulated, replicates the pref-
erence confirmation effect thereby supporting the relevance of the present materials for
the study of individual-level preference confirmation. Study 1 showed that participants
exhibited more preference confirmation and chose more confirmatory decisions in
competition than in cooperation, onlywhen theywere informed about others’ dissenting
preferences (hypotheses 1 and 2). The mediated moderation analysis confirmed that the
preference for consistent information is fully responsible for the confirmatory decisions
(hypothesis 3). These results were in line with our first three hypotheses.
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Table 2. Least square regression results for the mediated moderation model in Study 1
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
(criterion CD) (criterion PREFCOINF) (criterion CD)
Predictors B Wald B t B Wald
IV : GOAL 1.231 6.01∗ −0.575 −1.25 1.088 3.46
MO: DISSENT 0.464 0.85 −0.808 −1.76 0.109 0.03
IV × MO 2.005 3.98∗ −3.017 −3.29∗∗∗ 1.103 0.89
ME: PREFCOINF −0.529 9.73∗∗
ME × MO −0.391 1.32
Note. CD = confirmatory decision, PREFCOINF = preference for consistent information, IV =
independent variable, MO = moderator variable, ME = mediator variable.∗p  .05; ∗∗p  .01;
∗∗∗p  .001.
STUDY 2
We conducted a second study in order to further investigate the role of goal interdepen-
dence and dissent. The first aim of this study was to replicate Study 1 using a different
manipulation of dissent. In Study 1, the no dissent condition was operationalized by not
informing participants about other members’ preferences. Therefore, it was not clear
whether the results were the consequence of the dissent per se or the consequence of
receiving information about others’ preferences. A recent study by Mojzisch and Schulz-
Hardt (2010) showed that simply knowing others’ preferences has a strong negative
impact on information processing. Therefore, in this study, all participantswere informed
about othermembers’ preferences but they either learned that these preferences differed
from their own or that others’ preferences were the same as their own.
The second aim was to clarify the role of dissent with regard to cooperation and
competition. In Study 1, a difference in preference confirmation was found between
cooperation and competition in the dissent condition, but it is not clear yet whether the
dissent increased the preference confirmation in competition or whether it decreased it
in cooperation. Therefore, in Study 2 a baseline condition without goal instructions was
added to the cooperation and competition conditions.
The third aim of Study 2 was to provide more compelling evidence that preference
confirmation reflects strategic behaviour in competition. As suggested in the introduc-
tion, competition may motivate people to use self-enhancement strategies in order to
avoid disconfirming their preferences when facing the dissent with their opponents. It
is widely known that self-enhancement reflects strivings to raise one’s positive self-view
and superiority (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Because competition generally strengthens
these concerns (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004), competition may motivate people to use
preference confirmation as a self-enhancement strategy. Therefore, in this study we
tested whether in competition self-enhancement predicted preference confirmation as
a function of dissent (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants and design
One hundred twenty-two students from a large Belgian university volunteered for this
study. The sample included 88 women and 34 men (M = 22.79 years, SD = 2.58).
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A 3 (goal interdependence: cooperation, competition, control) × 2 (dissent: yes, no)
between-participants factorial designwas used. Two participants were excluded because
they did not choose the intended initial preference. Twenty participants were randomly
assigned to each experimental condition.
Procedure and materials
The procedure and materials were very similar to those of Study 1. We used the same
decision task. Participants were again oriented towards Mr. X as initial preference, while
fictitious group members were allegedly suggesting Mrs. Y and Mr. Z in the dissent
condition and the same Mr. X preference in the no dissent condition. Cooperation and
competition were induced using the same instructions as in Study 1. However, in order
to clearly understand the relative role of dissent in cooperation and competition, we
included a control condition inwhich participantswere confrontedwith othermembers’
preferences without any specific goal instruction. Subsequently, participants responded
to the self-enhancementmeasure (see below) and then they evaluated the supplementary
information items (half consistent and half inconsistent with their preference) provided
by the two other members, by indicating their importance inmaking an optimal decision.
Finally, participants were asked to make a final decision based on all the information
and responded to manipulation checks questions. At the end of the session, participants
were thanked and debriefed.
Dependent measures
Preference for consistent information
Participants evaluated to what extent the six items of consistent and inconsistent
information were important in reaching the optimal decision, on a scale ranging from 1
(not at all important) to 9 (very important). Again, the preference for consistent infor-
mation was computed by subtracting the ratings of inconsistent information ( = .71)
from the ratings of consistent information ( = .80).
Confirmatory decision
This dichotomous measure expressed whether participants maintained (coded 1) or not
(coded 0) their initial preference (Mr. X) when asked to make a final decision.
Self-enhancement
This measure refers to participants’ motivation to affirm their superiority and their
positive self-view during the decision task. Participants responded to five questions (‘I
would like my decision to be better than those of others’, ‘I would do anything to prove
that I’m superior to others’, ‘I wouldn’t like others to outperform me’, ‘I couldn’t stand
to be perceived as incompetent’, ‘I would stand up for my decision’) on a scale ranging
from (1 = not at all) to 9 ( = yes, definitely). These items were combined into a single
score ( = .74).
Manipulation checks
Five questions concerned with perception of competition and perception of dissent
were answered on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (yes, definitely).
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Three questions referring to perception of competition (‘I had reasons to mistrust the
others’, ‘In a real interaction, the atmosphere would have been tense’, ‘My goal was
to help others to find the correct solution – reversed-score’) were combined into a
single mean score ( = .62). Two questions referring to perception of dissent (‘Others’
preferences were different / the same as mine’.) were combined into a single mean score
(r = .85).
Results
Manipulation checks
Perception of competition and perception of dissent were both analyzed with a 3 (goal
interdependence: cooperation, control, competition) × 2 (dissent: yes, no) ANOVA.
Perception of competition was higher in competition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.49), than in
the control condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.31) and cooperation (M = 2.98, SD = 1.48),
F(2, 114) = 28.12, p < .001, p2 = .33. The main effect of dissent and the interaction
were not significant (dissent, F < 1; interaction, F(2, 114) = 2.46, p = .09).
Perception of dissent was higher in the dissent condition (M = 7.82, SD = 1.56) than
in the no dissent condition (M = 2.24, SD= 2.13), F(1, 114)= 271.02, p< .001,p2 = .70.
The main effect of goal interdependence and the interaction were not significant (goal
interdependence, F < 1; interaction, F(2, 114) = 2.55, p = .08). Despite this marginal
interaction, dissent was perceived as more important in the dissent condition than in the
no dissent condition in all goal conditions (competition: M = 7.50, SD = 1.61 vs.
M = 3.00, SD = 2.86; control: M = 7.90, SD = 1.39 vs. M = 1.82, SD = 1.61;
cooperation: M = 8.07, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 1.90, SD = 1.55; for the three t tests
p < .001).
Overview of main analyses
To test our main hypotheses we used regression analyses (linear regressions when the
dependent variable was preference for consistent information and logistic regression
when the dependent variable was confirmatory decision). Goal interdependence (com-
petition, control and cooperation) was defined by two orthogonal contrasts: C1, the
linear contrast (−1, 0, + 1) corresponding to our hypotheses and C2, the quadratic
contrast (−1, + 2, -1) corresponding to the residual variance. The proper use of contrast
analysis requires C1 to be significant and C2 to be non-significant (Abelson & Prentice,
1997). Dissent (present, absent) was defined by a C3, difference contrast (+ 1, −1). The
two goal interdependence by dissent interactions were computed by multiplying the
linear, and respectively the quadratic contrast corresponding to goal interdependence,
with the difference contrast corresponding to dissent. In sum, five predictors were used
for each regression model.
Preference for consistent information
When preference for consistent information was regressed on the five predictors, this
analysis revealed no main effect of goal interdependence (neither the linear, B = −.23,
SE = .25, t < 1, nor the quadratic contrast were significant, B = .15, SE = .14, t =
1.03, p = .31) and no main effect of dissent, B = −.35, SE = .21, t = −1.69, p = .09.
The predicted two-way interaction between the linear contrast corresponding to goal
interdependence and dissent was significant, B = −1.01, SE = .25, t = −3.98, p < .001,
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while the two-way interaction between the quadratic contrast corresponding to goal
interdependence and dissent was not significant, B = −.12, SE = .15, t < 1.
We further conducted simple effect analyses in order to better understand the role
of goal interdependence in the dissent and no dissent conditions. When dissent was
present we expected more preference for consistent information in competition than in
cooperation, as in Study 1, but our theoretical hypothesis – that preference confirmation
should appear most when disagreeing with competitors and least when disagreeing
with cooperators – also implied that preference confirmation in the control condition
should be in between that of cooperation and competition. This analysis revealed that
the linear contrast C1 was significant, B = −1.24, SE = .36, t = −3.45, p < .001, while
the quadratic contrast C2 was not, B= .03, SE = .21, t < 1. The preference for consistent
information was, as expected, higher in competition (M = 0.87, SD = 2.59), than in the
control condition (M = −0.28, SD = 1.62), which in turn was higher than in cooperation
(M = −1.62, SD = 1.91). In the no dissent condition, the linear contrast C1 was also
significant, B = .78, SE = .36, t = 2.18, p < .05, while the quadratic contrast C2 was
not, B = .27, SE = .21, t = 1.31, p = .19. The preference for consistent information was
this time lower in competition (M = −0.70, SD = 2.68), than in the control condition
(M = 0.90, SD = 2.60), and cooperation (M = 0.87, SD = 2.00), but post hoc analyses
revealed that the control condition did not differ from the cooperation condition,
p > .05. These results are illustrated in Figure 3.
Confirmatory decision
Overall, 61 of 120 participants (50.83%) chose this decision. When confirma-
tory decision was regressed on the five predictors, logistic regression analy-
ses revealed no main effect of goal interdependence (neither the linear nor
the quadratic contrasts were significant) or dissent (the three Wald  2 < 1).
However, the predicted interaction between the linear contrast corresponding
to goal interdependence and dissent was significant, B = −.74, SE = .24,
Wald  2(1, N = 120) = 9.46, p < .01, while the interaction between the quadratic
contrast corresponding to goal interdependence and dissent was not significant, Wald
 2 < 1. We further conducted simple effect analyses in order to better understand the
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Figure 3. Preference for consistent information as a function of goal interdependence and dissent
(Study 2).
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role of goal interdependence in the dissent and no dissent conditions. When dissent was
present, as predicted by hypothesis 2, more participants chose the confirmatory decision
in competition (15) than in the control condition (10), which in turn ismore than in coop-
eration (6). This corresponds to a significant linear contrast C1 (−1, 0, + 1), B = −.37,
SE = .12, Wald  2(2, N = 120) = 8.14, p < .05. In the no dissent condition, the
linear contrast was also significant, B = .40, SE = .13, Wald  2(2, N = 120) = 8.55,
p < .01. This time, less participants chose the confirmatory decision in competition
(7) than in the control condition (11) and cooperation (12). The proportions
of confirmatory decisions corresponding to each condition are presented in
Table 1.
Mediated moderation analysis
We tested whether the goal interdependence by dissent interaction effect on the confir-
matory decision was due to a preference for consistent information, which corresponds
to hypothesis 3. The same model as above was used, where goal interdependence
was coded using two orthogonal contrasts: a linear contrast C1 (−1, 0, + 1) and
a quadratic contrast C2 (−1, + 2, −1), and dissent was contrast coded (−1, + 1);
preference for consistent information was centred at its mean. The interaction between
the linear contrast corresponding to goal interdependence and dissent was found on
the confirmatory decision, B = −.74, SE = .24, Wald  2(1, N = 120) = 9.46, p < .01.
The same moderation was also found on the preference for consistent information, B =
−1.01, SE = .25, t(119) = −3.98, p < .001. When controlling for preference for consis-
tent information, the overall moderation lost its significance, B = −.45, SE = .27, Wald
 2(1, N = 120) = 2.88, p = .09, while the preference for consistent information still sig-
nificantly predicted the confirmatory decision, B= .40, SE = .11, Wald  2(1,N = 120) =
13.41, p < .001. Moreover, the residual of the moderation of goal interdependence by
dissent was reduced from B = −.74 to B = −.45, ZSobel = −2.70, p < .01. Table
3 presents the regression models that estimate equations 1 through 3 with these
variables.
Table 3. Least square regression results for the mediated moderation model in Study 2
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Predictors (criterion CD) (criterion PREFCOINF) (criterion CD)
B Wald B t B Wald
IV (C1): GOAL −0.230 0.91 −0.229 −0.90 −0.151 0.32
IV (C2): GOAL 0.030 0.05 0.151 1.03 −0.027 0.03
MO: DISSENT 0.044 0.05 −0.350 −1.68 0.217 1.01
IV (C1) × MO −0.743 9.45∗∗ −1.013 −3.98∗∗∗ −0.454 2.88
IV (C2) × MO −0.072 0.29 −0.121 −0.82 −0.061 0.18
ME: PREFCOINF 0.405 13.41∗∗∗
ME × MO 0.036 0.10
Note. CD = confirmatory decision, PREFCOINF = preference for consistent information, IV =
independent variable, MO = moderator variable, ME = mediator variable.∗p  .05; ∗∗p  .01;
∗∗∗p  .001.
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Self-enhancement and preference for consistent information
In hypothesis 4, we expected that competition would elicit self-enhancement strategies,
such as using preference confirmation as a function of dissent. The specific prediction
was therefore that, since – as argued in the introduction – self-enhancement is a typical
strategy in competitive settings,3 it should positively predict preference confirmation
in case of dissent. The regression model used to predict the preference for consistent
information included as predictors: goal interdependence (decomposed by the two
orthogonal contrasts C1, C2), dissent, self-enhancement, and all the two-way and the
three-way interactions between these variables.4 The analysis revealed a three-way
interaction between the linear contrast corresponding to goal interdependence, dissent,
and self-enhancement, B = −0.29, SE = .11, t = −2.60, p < .05. Follow-up analyses
revealed that the predicted two-way interaction between self-enhancement and dissent
in competition was significant, B = 1.13, SE = .37, t = 3.07, p < .01. Simple slopes
analysis showed that in the dissent condition, as predicted, self-enhancement positively
predicted the preference for consistent information, B = 1.15, SE = .52, t = 2.21,
p < .05, while in the no dissent condition, self-enhancement negatively predicted the
preference for consistent information, B = −1.12, SE = .52, t = −2.14, p < .05.
Discussion
Results of Study 2 replicated those of Study 1. Indeed, in the dissent condition preference
confirmation was higher in competition than in cooperation, which was not the case in
the no dissent condition (hypothesis 1). Actually, in the no dissent condition preference
confirmation was higher in cooperation than in competition; it is possible that in Study 2
–where, unlike Study 1, the no dissent condition implied that participants had exactly the
same preferences as the alleged partners – cooperation created a sort of groupthink effect
(Janis, 1972), whereby participants were particularly focused on consensus. Moreover,
an intriguing findingwas the presence of preference disconfirmation in competitionwith
no dissent. Although not predicted by our hypothesis, this behaviour was also related to
self-enhancement. This suggests that all participants in competition were motivated by
self-enhancement, but they used confirmation when others supported different prefer-
ences (dissent) and used disconfirmation when others supported the same preference
(no dissent), likely in an attempt to reinstate differences, a phenomenon known as
‘dissimilation’ (Lemaine & Personnaz, 1981). Finally, under dissent, participants in the
3Indeed, it appeared that self-enhancement is typical of competition. A 2 (goal interdependence: cooperation, control,
competition, control) X 2 (dissent: yes, no) ANOVA revealed a main effect of goal interdependence, F(2, 114) = 24.88, p 
.001, p2 = .30. Self-enhancement was higher in competition (M = 6.41, SD = 1.06) than in the control condition (M =
4.55, SD = 1.52), and cooperation (M = 4.72, SD = 1.15). The specific contrast C4 (+ 2, −1, −1) opposing the competition
to the other two conditions was significant, B = 0.59, SE = .08, t = 7.03, p  .001, while the contrast C5 (0, + 1, -1) was
not significant, B = −.08, SE = .14, t 1. Neither the main effect of dissent, nor the interaction were significant, F(1, 114) =
2.33, p = .13 and F  1. Moreover, the means for self-enhancement in the cooperation and control conditions were not
significantly different from the mid-point of the scale, respectively t = 1.23, p = .22 and t  1, while they were significantly
different in competition, t = 38.18, p  .001, which suggests that the self-enhancement appears only competition.
4Goal interdependence and self-enhancement were correlated r = −.45, p  .001, but colinearity statistics confirmed the
absence of multicolinearity. Tolerance coefficients were.78 and.70 and the VIF coefficients were 1.29 and 1.43 for goal
interdependence and self-enhancement.
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control condition exhibited an intermediate level of preference confirmation, lower
than in competition, but higher than in cooperation, suggesting that dissent can have
both reducing and enhancing effects on preference confirmation as a function of goal
interdependence.
With regard to decision quality, more participants chose the confirmatory decision
in competition than in cooperation in the dissent condition, which was not the case
in the no dissent condition (hypothesis 2). Again, and consistent with the above
analysis, in the no dissent conditionmore participants chose the confirmatory decision in
cooperation than in competition. Notwithstanding the complexity of the experimental
design, we replicated the mediated moderation effect found in Study 1, showing that the
preference for consistent information mediated the predicted interaction effect on the
confirmatory decision (hypothesis 3). Finally, consistent with the specific hypothesis
of Study 2 (hypothesis 4), participants in competition, who exhibited a high level of
self-enhancement (superior to control condition and cooperation), displayed a positive
relationship between self-enhancement and the preference for consistent information
in the dissent condition; self-enhancement in competition was also correlated with the
preference for consistent information in the dissent condition but this time in a negative
way. In otherwords, all participants in competitionweremotivated by self-enhancement,
but this motivation positively predicted preference confirmation in the dissent condition,
and negatively in the no dissent condition, underlining that preference confirmation may
very well be a strategic way to cope with competition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Preference confirmation, a motivated process
Our general contention is that preference confirmation partly reflects a motivated
process that serves hidden profile members’ goals. Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003)
have shown that preference confirmation could be responsible for members’ inability to
reach optimal decisions. We proposed that individual members may exhibit preference
confirmation, especially in competition, compared to cooperation, when they face the
dissent of others’ preferences. This hypothesis was fully supported by our results. In
the pilot study, where neither goals nor dissent were manipulated, we replicated the
overall preference confirmation effect – both on preference for consistent information
and confirmatory decision – thereby supporting the relevance of the presentmaterials for
the study of individual-level preference confirmation. In the two main studies, however,
where both goals and dissent were manipulated, we found that participants did not
exhibit an overall preference confirmation, but rather used confirmation as a function
of goals and dissent. The two-way interaction predicted by hypothesis 1, and found
in both studies, revealed that, when informed about others’ dissenting preferences,
participants in competition exhibited a preference for consistent information more
than participants in cooperation, which was not the case when participants were not
informed about dissent (Study 1) or when participants were informed that there was no
dissent (Study 2). Interestingly, Study 2 has shown that cooperation can also increase
preference confirmation when group members share consensual preferences. This is
consistent with studies showing that confirmation bias is aggravated in groups with
homogenous preferences (Frey, 1986; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Our
research contributes to this line of research by pointing out the role of cooperation in
inducing this effect.
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The result on the final decision nicely complemented the picture, asmore participants
kept their initial preference in competition than in cooperation in the dissent condition,
which was not the case without dissent, as predicted by hypothesis 2. Patterning the
results for preference confirmation, in Study 2, the no dissent condition revealed that
more participants kept their initial preference in cooperation than in competition.
Finally, the mediated moderation analysis fully demonstrates that the mechanism
underlying the choice of confirmatory decision is the more favourable evaluation of
information consistent with participants’ initial preference. In other words, when
participants attributed higher value to consistent than to inconsistent information,
namely in competition with dissent, this resulted in being more prone to stick to the
initial preference. Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt’s (2003) had also found a mediational
effect of preference for consistent information. However, because of the moderating
effect of goals and dissent on information evaluation, we are suggesting here that
participants may strategically distort their evaluation of available information so that
they can maintain their preferences at the decision stage. Greitemeyer and Schultz-
Hardt (2003) suggested that preference confirmation is due to insufficient amounts of
cognitive resources allocated to consistent and inconsistent information. The present
research adds that, notwithstanding the presence of a cognitive deficit effect, a strategic
distortion of information evaluation might occur as a function of the goals implied by
the decision-making setting. This is in line with a motivated information-processing
approach in decision making, proposing that individual members deliberately select
what information to mention and how to mention it to in order to satisfy relevant
goals (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Toma & Butera, 2009; Wittenbaum
et al., 2004).
Strategic information processing and underlying motivations
We propose in this research that preference confirmation in competition is associated
with self-enhancement strategies. By maintaining their initial preferences when con-
frontedwith the dissenting preferences coming fromothers, participants strived to affirm
their superiority and to keep the competitive advantage. However, when confronted
with consensus in initial preferences, the same self-enhancement strategy predicted
participants’ propensity to use disconfirmation and to change their preferences. This
provides supplementary evidence that people behave strategically in competition
because they used confirmation only when other’s preferences were different from
their own. This is consistent with work on achievement goals, demonstrating that
endorsement of performance-approach goals (competitive goals) is linkedwith the desire
to regulate this interaction with a partner by showing that one is right and the other
is wrong (Darnon et al., 2006; see also Buchs et al., 2010). This is also consistent with
work on negotiation, emphasizing that existing biases in information processing should
be reconsidered in order to identify social stakes and motivational concerns that might
guide individual group members to a strategic use of information (Steinel & De Dreu,
2004). Previous research has shown that information processing and strategic decisions
are influenced by goals; cooperative negotiators reach agreements of higher joint gain
than competitive negotiators (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), and cooperators
exchange more accurate information than competitors, who strategically misrepresent
their preferences in social decision making (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla,
1999; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004).
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Recent studies on conformity also show the existence of intra-group strategic
behaviour associated with cooperation (Jetten, Hornsey, & Adarves-Yorno, 2006). This
research suggests that conformity is functional and group members with low status
might strategically use this behaviour to appear as cooperative within the group. In
Study 2 participants in cooperation with no dissent, tended to maintain their preference,
probably in an attempt to conform to the group. Future studies should explore the exact
underlying motivation of strategic preference confirmation in cooperation. Therefore,
because the strategic use of preference confirmation was never addressed by previous
research on hidden profiles, we believe that the present results are an important
contribution in this domain.
Individual- and group-level processes in hidden profiles
Our research implies that although individual preference confirmation can explain
suboptimal decisions in hidden profiles, this individual process is moderated by group-
level processes such as members’ goals and the diversity in initial preferences. Previous
research overlooked that in hidden profiles individual members may be driven by a
mixture of cooperative and competitive goals that can impact the willingness to confirm
initial preferences. Research conducted at the group level has already shown that,
independently of dissent, competition induces more use of confirmatory strategies than
cooperation (Toma & Butera, 2009). The current study replicates this effect and extends
this work to the individual level.
We have pointed out that group members’ inability to discover hidden profiles
has been attributed for a long time to group-level processes (Winquist & Larson,
1998). Later, Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003) have shown that, in the absence
of any dysfunctional group-level process, individual group members still have difficulties
in detecting the best solution because they exhibit an individual-level preference
confirmation. Our research adds that the above two views need to be considered as
complementary: The results reported in the present study show that the individual-level
preference confirmation effect is moderated by group-level processes. This integration
suggests that preference confirmation is indeed an important feature of group decision
making, that should be taken into account in professional and educational settings; it
is not, however, an inevitable feature. This research shows that it can be reduced by
providing a cooperative context for decision making, in which the diversity in positions
and solutions can be viewed as a contribution and not a hindrance.
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